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Abstract  
In 2000 Robert Putnam forecast that United States (US) democracy was at risk from the twin 
challenges of declining civic engagement and rising interpersonal inequality. Sixteen years later, 
his predictions were vindicated by the election of Donald Trump as president of the US. This 
paper analyses the extent to which the election of Donald Trump was related to levels of social 
capital and interpersonal inequalities and posits a third alternative: that the rise in vote for 
Trump in 2016 was the result of long-term economic and population decline in areas with 
strong social capital. This hypothesis is confirmed by the econometric analysis conducted for 
counties across the US. Long-term declines in employment and population – rather than in 
earnings, salaries, or wages – in places with relatively strong social capital propelled Donald 
Trump to the presidency. By contrast, low social capital and high interpersonal inequality were 
not connected to a surge in support for Trump. These results are robust to the introduction of 
control variables and different inequality measures. The analysis also shows that the discontent 
at the base of the Trump margin is not just a consequence of the 2008 crisis but had been 
brewing for a long time. Places in the US that remained cohesive but witnessed an enduring 
decline are no longer bowling alone, they are golfing with Trump. 
Keywords: Populism, social capital, inequality, economic and demographic decline, Donald 
Trump, counties, US. 
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Introduction 
Just over 20 years ago, Robert Putnam (2000) wrote Bowling Alone. In this seminal book 
Putnam used the fact that Americans were increasingly bowling alone as a metaphor for the 
decline in civic engagement and political participation – and in all forms of social capital – that 
had become a dominating trend in the United States (US) since the 1960s. Americans were 
bowling alone because bowling clubs and leagues were disappearing. But the decline in social 
capital across the US did not stop at bowling. There was wane in all other sorts of civic 
engagement and social trust, from political participation, voter turnout, newspaper readership, 
personal letter writing, or union membership, to church attendance, club meetings, social 
visiting, card playing, charitable giving, or volunteering. For Putnam this decline in community 
engagement was destroying the very fabric of American communities and represented a 
fundamental threat for democracy, as “the performance of […] democratic institutions depends 
in measurable ways upon social capital” (Putnam, 2000: 394).  
The progressive erosion of American social capital took place in parallel with another factor 
regularly considered one of the main drivers of populism in the developed world: the rise in 
interpersonal inequality. The US – which experienced a significant drop in interpersonal 
inequality during World War II that continued well into the post-war period – started becoming 
more and more unequal. From the late 1960s and, especially, since the 1970s, the country has 
become much more polarised, with the gap between the rich and the rest of society growing 
rapidly (Katz and Murphy, 1992; Piketty and Saez, 2003). According to Putnam (2000: 359), “the 
timing of the two trends [is] striking: Sometime around 1965–70 America reversed course and 
started becoming both less just economically and less well connected socially and politically.” 
The combination of declining social capital with the rising interpersonal inequality represented 
for Putnam the biggest threat to American democracy. 
Less than two decades later, Putnam’s prophecy was, in part, fulfilled. The election of Donald 
Trump – considered by many a “polarising and politically inexperienced figure […] who uses 
populist rhetoric to legitimise his style of governance, while promoting authoritarian values that 
flattened the liberal norms underpinning American democracy” (Norris and Inglehart, 2019: 3) – 
has put US democratic institutions under severe strain, stretching democracy in America to the 
extreme. 
However and although Donald Trump’s election and presidency have indeed affected US 
democratic health, it is far less certain that the motives for the populist sway in the American 
electorate had to do with a combination of high interpersonal inequality and lower social 
capital. It has already been noted that the poorest of the poor and the richest of the rich in US 
society often voted together for Hillary Clinton in the 2016 presidential election (Inglehart and 
Norris, 2017; Rodríguez-Pose, 2018; Smith and Hanley, 2018). Support for Hillary Clinton was 
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particularly strong in some of the most unequal large cities of the US, where social capital is far 
less prevalent than in midtown and rural America. As indicated by Rodríguez-Pose (2020: 6) 
“the very wealthy suburbs of West Philadelphia voted for Hillary Clinton alongside the deprived 
Philadelphia Badlands to the north of the City.” By contrast, Donald Trump amassed large 
numbers of votes among white working-class voters in long-term declining medium-size cities, 
suburbs, towns, and rural areas (Cramer, 2016; Rodden, 2019), which had once been not only 
the industrial and economic motors of the US, but also the poster children of America’s 
communities and social capital. 
Hence, other factors rather than inequality and low social capital may have driven the surge in 
Trump vote and, therefore, the rise of populism in the US. Prominent among these factors, as 
this paper will posit, is the decline in small cities, towns, and many rural areas across the US and 
the related rise in interterritorial, rather than interpersonal, inequality.  
We will analyse for the first time the link between social capital, interpersonal inequality, and 
long-term economic and demographic decline in America’s communities, on the one hand, and 
the rise in populist vote, on the other. The aim is to show that the surge in populism in the US – 
epitomised by the election of Donald Trump in 2016 – may not have come from, as suggested 
by Putnam (2020), low social capital or high interpersonal inequality (at least, at the local level), 
or their combination. We argue that a fundamental driver in the swing of votes towards Donald 
Trump in the 2016 election is a factor that has remained relatively unnoticed not just in 
Putnam’s Bowling alone, but also in the overwhelming majority of the literature on the rise of 
populism in the US:1 the long-term economic and demographic decline of American towns and 
rural areas and the related rise in interterritorial inequality.  
The role of these three factors in the election of Donald Trump as President of the United 
States are assessed, by considering the increase in votes for the Republican Party between the 
2012 and 2016 presidential elections – what we call the Trump margin – at county level.  
We hypothesise that low social capital alone is unlikely to have triggered the swing to Donald 
Trump in the 2016 presidential election and that interpersonal inequality at the local level is 
unrelated with increases in Trump’s vote share. We propose that it is precisely the long-term 
economic and demographic decline of the places that still rely on a relatively strong social 
capital, the decline of many areas of the American Rustbelt and the Great Plains that helped 
forge the economic success of the US for the best of a century, that is behind the rise of 
populism in the US. Strong, but declining communities have reacted to being ignored, 
neglected, and suffering long-term decline. 
                                                            
1 This is, however, not the case in the European literature on the geographical roots of populism (e.g. Rodríguez-
Pose, 2018; Dijkstra et al., 2020; McCann, 2020). 
4 
 
The results of the analysis show that increases in populist vote in the US are fundamentally 
driven by the economic and demographic decline of strongly cohesive mid-town and rural 
America. These places still have greater levels of social capital than more dynamic and unequal 
areas of the US. This social capital has played a role in the swing of votes within communities 
driven by a growing feeling of frustration, increasingly known as the rising geography of 
discontent (McCann, 2020) or the politics of resentment (Cramer, 2016). In small cities and 
rural areas of the US, scattered fundamentally across the Rustbelt and the Great Plains, the rise 
in populist vote represents a reaction of strong communities in which individual losses are 
strongly identified with collective losses. These so-called ‘places that don’t matter’ (Rodríguez-
Pose, 2018) have had enough of seeing their people leave and their jobs go and have used the 
ballot box to exact revenge on a system they consider offers little to them. By contrast, the 
more dynamic, mainly urban areas of the US, where society is often less cohesive, where there 
is less social capital, and where interpersonal inequalities are significantly higher, have, for the 
moment, shunned the calls of populism. 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section will study the rise of populism in the US. 
This will be followed by a section looking at explanations for the growth of populism, focusing, 
in particular, on social capital, interpersonal inequality, and long-term economic and 
demographic decline. The methods and data used in the analysis are presented in the ensuing 
section, which is followed by the econometric analysis. The main conclusions of the study are 
put forward in the final section. 
 
The rise of populism in the US  
On 8 November 2016, Donald Trump was elected president of the US. Trump, a businessman 
with limited previous political experience, managed against the odds first to secure the 
Republican Party nomination and then the presidency on a political platform with strong 
nationalist and authoritarian populist tendencies (Norris and Inglehart, 2019), promising to 
“make America great again.” 
Trump’s election was achieved on the wings of winning the electoral votes of crucial swing 
states, such as Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, and Wisconsin. In these states – like very much 
everywhere else in the US – the votes for the Democratic candidate, Hillary Clinton, were 
geographically concentrated in the larger cities. Clinton triumphed in cities like Philadelphia, 
Pittsburgh, Columbus, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Detroit, Milwaukee, or Madison and took some 
university towns in states like Ohio and Pennsylvania. The suburbs, towns, and rural areas, by 
contrast, provided fundamental support for Donald Trump (Rodden, 2019).  
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Figure 1 shows what we call the Trump margin, that is the swing in the share of votes towards 
the Republican Party between the 2012 presidential election – when Mitt Romney was the 
Republican presidential candidate – and the 2016 election. The Trump margin is in evidence in 
most of the mid-Atlantic, Midwest, and Great Plains states. The greatest swing took place in an 
arch surrounding the Great Lakes, drawing a semicircle expanding from northern Maine in the 
East to north-eastern Minnesota in the West (Figure 1). 
Figure 1. The ‘Trump margin’ in the 2016 presidential election. 
 
 
In contrast, Donald Trump attracted less votes than Mitt Romney in Utah (a state with strong 
connections to Romney), in Arizona and areas of Idaho, New Mexico, and Wyoming, as well as 
in urban agglomerations in western states and in the eastern urban megalopolis, stretching 
between Washington, DC and Boston. 
Possible explanations for the rise of populism 
Why did Donald Trump get elected in 2016? What are the reasons behind the rise of 
authoritarian populism in the US? 
The rise of authoritarian populism in the US has coincided with that in other western 
democracies. Especially in the second half of the 2010s, it has attracted considerable attention 
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from researchers who have tried to investigate the causes of populism from different 
perspectives. The main divide in the studies of populism has been between those focusing on 
cultural versus those emphasising economic explanations. 
Those examining culture and values have centred their explanations around the role of values 
(Norris and Inglehart, 2019). Citizens that have embraced populism are those that feel ill at ease 
with what they increasingly regard a different society from the one they grew up in or with the 
image of society transmitted to them by their parents and family. These citizens generally 
regard globalisation, migration, and multiculturalism as key factors behind the rise of economic 
but also cultural and identity insecurities (Salmela and von Scheve, 2017; Norris and Inglehart, 
2019). The change in cultural values threatens their identity and undermines family and 
religious traditions, transforming the environment they live in into one they no longer feel 
comfortable with (Norris and Inglehart, 2019). Gradually, this insecurity has become anger and 
resentment towards a system that, in their view, no longer values them (Salmela and von 
Scheve, 2017). 
Economic explanations revolve around the economic insecurity brewed by deregulation and 
globalisation (Guiso et al., 2017). Factors such as the openness to trade and the exposure to 
Chinese goods (Autor et al., 2016; Colantone and Stanig, 2018) are high in this strand of 
research. Recent economic transformations are exploited by populist, invoking protectionism 
while stoking economic nationalism, like in Donald Trump’s “Make America great again” 
campaign slogan. Post-financial crisis austerity has also been considered a driver of discontent 
(Gray and Barford, 2018). 
Cultural and economic transformations are causing rising discontent and resentment with a 
system that is increasingly reflected in the electoral ballot. Voters supporting populist options 
are both swayed by their individual characteristics – such as age, race, education, exposure to 
new technologies, health, work status, or welfare dependency – as well as by the conditions of 
the places where they live (Alabrese et al., 2019). 
At the intersection between culture and economics, two factors were signalled by Putnam as 
the main risks for American democracy. Social capital, on the one hand, as “the performance of 
[…] democratic institutions depends in measurable ways upon social capital” (Putnam, 2000: 
349), and interpersonal inequality and the increasing polarisation of American society, on the 
other. 
Putnam argued both trends went hand in hand and reinforced one another (Putnam, 2000: 
359): “the last third of the twentieth century was a time of growing inequality and eroding 
social capital. By the end of the twentieth century, the gap between rich and poor in the United 
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States had been increasing for nearly three decades, the longest sustained increase in 
inequality in at least a century, coupled with the first sustained decline in social capital.”  
In the next subsections, we look at the potential role of both factors in the rise of populism, 
plus that of long-term economic and demographic decline as a possible alternative. 
Social capital as a driver of populism 
Social capital has become one of the dominant concepts in the social sciences. The concept 
draws on a longstanding body of research in the social sciences, which suggests that social 
networks matter for all sorts of social and economic outcomes. Coleman (1988) defined social 
capital as a resource considering (a) obligations and expectations, (b) information channels, and 
(c) social norms. These three aspects of social relationships reduce the coordination costs of 
shared action and improve outcomes, moving away from a static view of social relations and 
economic activity as being about individualised actors, and towards a view that economic 
activities are relational rather than simply transactional (Rodríguez-Pose and Storper, 2006). 
Putnam took on this concept and defined it as “the features of social life – networks, norms, 
and trust – that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared 
objectives” (Putnam, 1995: 664).  
Most views of social capital consider it a force for good. In his work on the strength of weak 
ties, Granovetter (1977) showed the importance of social relations in enhancing economic 
outcomes. Similarly, Putnam (1993) explained the economic divergence between the North and 
the South of Italy on differences in civic tradition between the North and the South. In Bowling 
Alone, he indicated that social capital “strengthens our better, more expansive selves” (Putnam, 
2000: 394) and, among other benefits, reinforces government legitimacy (ibid.: 347), predicts 
tax compliance (ibid.: 347), and helps citizens resist the temptation to cheat (ibid.: 394). 
Hence, the long-term decline of social capital in the US posed a serious threat to American 
society and its democracy, as it pushes citizens to free-ride “by neglecting the myriad civic 
duties that allow […] democracy to work” (Putnam, 2000: 349). 
However, and although most research on social capital views it as a positive thing, there are 
also longstanding concerns that it can have negative consequences. Olson (1965) viewed 
associational behaviour as lapsing into special interest groups. Coleman (1998) argued that 
social capital was defined (a) in relation to some aspect of social structure, (b) to allow or 
enable action within that structure. But he cautioned that there was no guarantee that (b) is a 
positive action, using the example of price-fixing as one activity facilitated by social capital. 
Overall, closed networks may enable the development of social capital, but they can also allow 
the development of group-think and incentives to engage in factional behaviour rather than in 
the general interest (Rodríguez-Pose and Storper, 2006) and prevent the progress of new ideas 
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and social change (Coleman, 1988). In short, a tight-knit community can entrench the “forces of 
tradition” and restrict social change (Farole et al., 2011: 68). 
In terms of how social capital can affect voting behaviour, social capital is often seen as a pillar 
of a functioning democracy, something which goes back to Alexander de Tocqueville and his 
argument that civic association underpinned the US democratic model. Similarly, Putnam 
(1993) argues that the lack of adequate social capital in southern Italy undermined democracy 
and legitimate political representation. His arguments for the US are that a declining social 
capital not only depresses civic engagement and political participation but that it also destroys 
connectedness and trust. The increasingly empty public forums that became the norm in the 
last third of the 20th century represented a threat to American democracy (Putnam, 2000: 412). 
In this respect, social capital can be considered as a form of protection against populism or 
demagoguery. Pre-dating the post-crisis resurgence of populism, Fieschi and Haywood (2004) 
indicated that a lack of trust in political institutions could fuel populism. Both Putnam (1993; 
2000) and Fieschi and Haywood (2004) essentially viewed social capital as essential for a 
healthy democracy and having a purely negative impact on populism (i.e. where there is greater 
trust, political relationships are healthier and more mutually respectful, and so populists are 
less able to blame elites). 
But this positive view of social capital has, more recently, also been challenged. Satyanath et al. 
(2017), for example, showed that German states with higher levels of social capital – proxied by 
associational behaviour – facilitated in the 1930s a rapid expansion of Nazi ideas and, in turn, 
Hitler’s accession to the Chancellery through higher shares of votes for the Nazi party. The 
presence of large and dense networks involving high levels of trust expedited a swift flow of 
information and a more rapid exposure to Nazi party propaganda.  
Interpersonal inequality and populism 
Putnam (2000) saw rising interpersonal inequality as the other main risk for American 
democracy. For him, the increase in interpersonal inequality and the decline of social capital 
were two sides of the same coin. On the one hand, the rise in inequality of the last third of the 
20th century (Katz and Murphy, 1992) disrupted participation and torn civic engagement apart. 
On the other, the decline in social capital accelerated the disintegration of American 
communities and eased the implementation of policies and the passing of legislation that 
fermented greater inequality. This process also had a geographical component as “the 
American states with the highest levels of social capital are precisely the states most 
characterised by economic and civic equality” (Putnam, 2000: 359). 
This view of interpersonal inequality as a threat to democracy and, therefore, a driver of 
populism has been shared by many economists who have delved into the roots of the recent 
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rise of authoritarian populism in developed countries. The rise in wealth polarisation in 
American society – as well as elsewhere in the developed world – is a fundamental factor for 
the increasing support of extreme anti-system options at the ballot box. Economic 
transformations in recent decades – and, above all, globalisation and automation – have driven 
“multiple, partially overlapping wedges in society” (Rodrik, 2018: 23). One of these 
fundamental wedges concerns income and wages. The economic system has been leaving 
increasing shares of the population behind, in conditions that are financially insecure (Guiso et 
al., 2017; Eichengreen, 2018). The concentration of wealth in a dwindling number of hands 
(Piketty and Saez, 2014; Milanovic, 2016) – the top 1% (Dorling, 2019) – and the parallel rise in 
the people at risk of poverty in developed countries (O’Connor, 2017; Rodrik, 2018) is 
increasingly considered tainted with a stigma of unfairness (Rodrik, 2018: 23). Citizens have 
come to believe that the growing wealth of the elites has been earned unfairly and, 
consequently, the tolerance towards inequality has decreased (Pastor and Veronesi, 2018). 
Hence, interpersonal inequality – which is often confounded with economic unfairness 
Starmans et al., 2017) – is, from this perspective, becoming a driver of the rise of populism, as it 
pushes voters towards illiberal and anti-system parties at the ballot box. Inequality is perceived 
to drive voters against the status quo, resulting in an erosion of democratic institutions and 
leading to nativism and plutocracy (Milanovic, 2016). 
For Putnam (2000: 359) “there is every reason to think that the twin master trends of our 
time—less equality, less engagement—reinforce one another.” Thus, fighting the decline of 
social capital is also a way to prevent the rise of inequality and vice versa. It is also the best way 
to combat the challenges besieging American democracy. 
The role of long-term economic decline  
Putnam’s work is about all sorts of decline. From that in civic engagement or in political 
participation to declines in bowling or card playing. All these declines are meticulously 
documented in Bowling alone. Yet, there is one type of decline that is conspicuously absent 
from Putnam’s (2000) analysis: that of small-town and rural America. Similarly, the growth of 
territorial inequalities and the rising geographical polarisation in the US does not feature 
prominently in Putnam’s work.  
The demographic and economic decline of small-town and rural America has been documented 
for quite some time (e.g. Fuguitt et al., 1989; Johnson, 2006). Small towns and large swaths of 
rural areas have been losing population and jobs throughout the second half of the 20th century 
and the beginning of the 21st century. The decline of these areas has been matched by the 
evolution of many large cities, such as Detroit, Cleveland, Buffalo, Milwaukee, or Toledo, once 
among the most dynamic industrial hubs in the country (Hartt, 2018). Many of these cities 
articulated – and still articulate – large hinterlands in so-called ‘Rustbelt’ states. 
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Such decline has had important implications for social capital in the US. According to Putnam 
(2000: 207), “the decline in social connectedness over the last third of the twentieth century 
might be attributable to the continuing eclipse of small-town America”. This is because small-
town and rural America have for long been the centres of civic engagement. In these areas 
people have been and remain community-oriented (Wuthnow, 2019: 4). During most of 
America’s history this feeling of community, widespread across the whole of the US, was 
considered as a force for good. “Residents of small towns and rural areas are more altruistic, 
honest, and trusting than other Americans”, noted Putnam (2000: 205). Communities with a 
better endowment of social capital have been perceived to be able to cope better with all sorts 
of economic and social challenges (Rupasingha et al., 2006). 
However, when these communities suffer long-term population and economic decline, the very 
social capital behind the cohesiveness and former dynamism of these areas can also channel 
the growing anger and resentment felt by those being left behind. When the feeling of neglect 
becomes widespread (Rodríguez-Pose, 2018; Wuthnow, 2019), when there is growing 
resentment about the rising economic gulf between large cities and small communities 
(Cramer, 2016: 83), social capital at a local scale can become the mechanism to diffuse that 
anger and outrage at a system they feel no longer represents and serves them at the ballot box. 
Areas with a strong social capital develop a consciousness which helps shape their political 
views (Cramer, 2016) and this consciousness is inherently related to place. In this respect “place 
matters because it functions as a lens through which people interpret politics” (Cramer, 2016: 
12). This consciousness is both rooted in place and class, but also “infused with a sense of 
distributive injustice” (Cramer, 2016: 12). And it may also be the mechanism that feeds the 
increasing call for attention of places that have seen far better times, have been devastated by 
economic processes such as globalisation or automation, and where people are becoming 
effectively stuck because of lack of capacity and/or opportunities for mobility (Rodríguez-Pose, 
2018: 202). These processes have contributed to render their economies redundant and, often, 
to undermine the self-esteem and sense of purpose of many local dwellers. Such consciousness 
is contributing to spread out a geography of discontent (Dijkstra et al., 2020; McCann, 2020) 
and a politics of resentment (Cramer, 2016) to places that have had a rough ride linked to both 
economic and cultural transformations and have seen their friends and neighbours leave, their 
jobs dwindle, and their services gradually disappear (Collantes and Pinilla, 2019; Guilluy, 2019). 
Social capital can, in this respect, provide the vehicle for this anger to come out into the open at 
the ballot box (Rodríguez-Pose, 2018) or, increasingly, through rebellion and revolt (Guilluy, 
2019). 
11 
 
Bringing together social capital, inequality, and demographic and economic decline 
What can be expected from the combination of dwindling social capital, rising inequality, and 
the demographic and economic decline of many cities, small towns, and rural areas in the US? 
Depending on the perspective adopted, two potential outcomes can be expected. 
On the one hand, as posited by Putnam (2000), the threats posed by populist tendencies to 
American democracy could be addressed by redressing the decline of social capital and the 
increase in inequality. Anger at the system would, therefore, be more prevalent in those places 
where there is a combination of high inequality and low social capital. That is, fundamentally, in 
large American cities. In these places “efforts to strengthen social capital should go hand in 
hand with efforts to increase equality” (Putnam, 2000: 359). 
On the other, remnants of strong social capital that foster a pervasive consciousness within 
declining cities, but, especially, in small towns and rural areas across the US could have served 
as a means to guide the growing anger of long-term decline to the ballot box in numbers and 
ways that would be impossible in places with lower social capital stock. 
The evidence of the 2016 presidential election points to the latter explanation. The 
demographically and economically more dynamic, mainly urban areas in the US, where society 
is less cohesive, but where interpersonal inequalities are significantly higher, shunned the calls 
of populism and voted in big numbers for Hillary Clinton. By contrast, many long-term declining 
communities with strong social capital embraced Donald Trump in far greater numbers than 
they had supported Mitt Romney – a far more mainstream Republican presidential candidate – 
four years earlier. 
Hence, in this paper, we will argue that the rise of populism in the US – proxied by the swing to 
Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election – is not related, as feared by Putnam (2000), 
two low levels of social capital, high interpersonal inequality, or their combination, but mainly 
to long-term economic and demographic decline. We will also argue that strong social capital, 
civic engagement, and cohesiveness may have contributed to the revenge at the ballot box of 
places left behind (Wuthnow, 2019), of places that are increasingly considered to no longer 
matter (Rodríguez-Pose, 2018), and that have felt neglected and snubbed for a considerable 
amount of time (Cramer, 2016; McCann, 2020). Their strong social identity and local 
consciousness – in other words, their social capital – may have contributed to this rise of 
populism in ways that would have been impossible in the most dynamic US cities and towns. 
Populism will thus be mainly driven by the long-term economic and demographic decline of the 
strong communities that built America, while the rise of interpersonal inequality – while 
something that could generate conflict in the future – is for the moment not associated with 
populism.  
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Model and data  
Model 
In order to demonstrate that: 
a) Economic and demographic decline are fundamental factors in the rise of populism in the US 
and that this process has become exacerbated in the tightly-knit communities with strong social 
capital that have witnessed an erosion of their relevance; 
b) This process is not limited to the aftermath of the crisis, but goes back a long way, with roots 
that can be traced to, at least, the 1970s; and 
c) Populism is more fundamentally connected with long-term decline than with local 
interpersonal inequality, which tends to be far higher outside those tightly-knit communities; 
we will analyse the swing of votes to the Republican party between the 2012 and 2016 
presidential elections – the Trump margin2 – and regress it on the three factors that might have 
driven the surge in vote for Trump in the 2016 election: social capital, interpersonal inequality, 
and economic and demographic decline. In view of the theoretical framework developed 
above, we will also look at the interactions between those factors, as the Trump vote could 
have increased in a) those places having suffered a long-term decline that are more unequal; in 
b) places with high social capital that are more unequal; and c) in places having suffered a long-
term decline, with a strong level of social capital. 
The model adopts the following form: 
ܶܯ௖,ଶ଴ଵଶିଶ଴ଵ଺ = ߙ + ߚଵ ܫ݊ܿ݋݉݁ ݌ܿ௖,ଶ଴ଵ଺ + ߚଶ ܫ݊݁ݍݑ݈ܽ݅ݐݕ௖,ଶ଴ଵ଺ +
ߚଷ ܵ݋݈ܿ݅ܽ ܥܽ݌݅ݐ݈ܽ௖,ଶ଴ଵ଺ + ߚସ ܧܿ݋݊݋݉݅ܿ & ܦ݁݉݋݃ݎܽ݌݄݅ܿ ܥ݄ܽ݊݃݁௖,ଶ଴ଵ଺ି௧ +  ߛଵ തܺ௖,௧ +
ߥ௦ + ߝ௖      (1)   
where,  
ܶܯ௖,ଶ଴ଵଶିଶ଴ଵ଺ represents the Trump margin, that is the change in the share of the vote between 
Donald Trump in 2016 and Mitt Romney in 2012;  
ܫ݊ܿ݋݉݁ ݌ܿ௖,ଶ଴ଵ଺ denotes the income per capita in a county in 2016;  
ܫ݊݁ݍݑ݈ܽ݅ݐݕ௖,ଶ଴ଵ଺ is a measure of income inequality within a county in 2016; 
                                                            
2 The swing in the share of votes is preferred to the share of Trump vote, as it is considered to be a better 
indication of the rise of populism in the US. Trump has been described (e.g. Norris and Inglehart, 2019) as an 
outsider with an authoritarian populist streak. Mitt Romney, by contrast, was a mainstream candidate with plenty 
of political experience within the Republican Party and a proven capacity in deal-making across partisan lines. 
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ܵ݋݈ܿ݅ܽ ܥܽ݌݅ݐ݈ܽ௖,ଶ଴ଵ଺ depicts the level of social capital in a county in 2016; 
ܧܿ݋݊݋݉݅ܿ & ܦ݁݉݋݃ݎܽ݌݄݅ܿ ܥ݄ܽ݊݃݁௖,ଶ଴ଵ଺ି௧ indicates changes in employment, population, 
average earnings, and average wages in a given county between 2016 and any year marking the 
start of a decade, going back to 1970; Xഥୡ,୲ is a vector of other variables that could have affected a shift in the vote for Donald Trump. 
These include variables that have been identified in the scholarly literature as factors behind the 
rise in Trump and/or populist vote, including population density, levels of unemployment, 
education, and racial composition at the county level; 
finally, ɋୱ is a state-level fixed-effect, while ɂୡ denotes the error term. 
Data  
Geographical units 
The analysis is conducted at county level. As the data are drawn from multiple sources and 
cover the last five decades, there was a need for some matching to reflect changes in county 
boundaries over the period of analysis. The data have, therefore, been levelled at the county 
geographical division used by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) in 2017. As county 
boundaries underwent extensive changes, particularly in the state of Virginia, some 
modifications have been included. In the case of Virginia 51 counties in the state have been 
assembled into 23 ‘county compounds’, or county-equivalents. Alaska, which also underwent 
considerable modification in local boundaries, is excluded from the analysis. In the rest of the 
US, county adjustments are either inexistent or very minor. A total of 3135 counties – or 
equivalent territorial units – are included in the analysis.3    
Dependent variable and independent variables of interest 
The dependent variable in our model is the ‘Trump Margin’ (Figure 1), which is based on data 
drawn from the MIT Election Data and Science Lab. It represents the difference in the share of 
voter support for Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election relative to that of the 
previous Republican candidate, Mitt Romney, in 2012. Following Goetz et al. (2019) and Agnew 
                                                            
3 The boundaries of Alaska’s county equivalents (boroughs and census districts) have undergone a considerable 
transformation, impairing the comparison over time. As Alaska's population represents a mere 0.2 percent of the 
total US population, its boroughs and census districts, just 1 percent of US counties or equivalent, and the state 
provides 1.9 percent of presidential electors, the omission of the state is unlikely to cause significant distortions. In 
the case of the state of Virginia, we follow the geography of the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Five 
additional counties were omitted because of lack of adequate data. These are: Maui and Kalawao (Hawaii), 
Broomfield (Colorado), Shawano and Menominee (Wisconsin). 
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and Shin (2019), we use the difference in share instead of Trump’s overall share of votes, as we 
assume that this margin better signifies the increase in populist vote between both elections.  
The three main independent variables of interest depict – following the theoretical discussion 
above – social capital, interpersonal inequality, and economic and demographic decline.
The measure for social capital is based on an update by researchers at Penn State for the year 
2014 of Rupasingha's et al. (2006) index. Rupasingha et al. (2006) created – inspired by 
Putnam’s (1993, 2000) concept of civic engagement and using principal component analysis – a 
social capital index at county level for the US including four key components. These were: a) the 
number of non-profit organisations in a county, excluding those with an international approach; 
b) the census response rates in 2010; c) voter turnout in the 2012 presidential election; and d) a 
number of associational indicators, including bowling centres, business, civic, and social 
associations, golf courses and country clubs, labour, professional, religious, and political 
organisations, fitness and recreational sports centres, sports teams and clubs, with all these 
factors aggregated and divided by population. The four factors included in the index were 
standardised. The first principal component is considered as the index of social capital. 
Figure 2. Social capital across the US in 2014.
 
Mapping this index at county level provides a very uneven geography of social capital across the 
US. The highest levels of social capital were concentrated around the Midwest and, especially, 
the Great Plains states. Both Dakotas, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, and 
Wyoming boasted the highest level of social capital. Social capital was also high in the 
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northwest (Oregon and Washington state) as well as in some areas around the Great Lakes, 
such as Wisconsin, rural Illinois, Ohio, eastern Pennsylvania, and parts of New England. Social 
capital was, by contrast, significantly weaker in the South —and, particularly, in Kentucky and 
Tennessee— and in some Mountain states, such as Arizona, Nevada, and Utah (Figure 2). 
The second independent variable of interest, Interpersonal inequality, is based on data drawn 
from the 2013-17 5-year American Community Survey (ACS). At the core of the analysis is the 
2016 county-level Gini index of incomes in a county. Two alternative measures are considered 
for robustness tests. These are the share of the population in the county in the top income 
quintile and that in the top 5% of income. 
Income inequality in the US is highest in the Deep South – and, particularly, in states such as 
Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, or eastern Kentucky – as well as in 
the largest urban agglomerations, such as New York City, Los Angeles, Chicago, Houston, Miami, 
Detroit, and the Bay Area (Figure 3). The lowest differences in income inequality are found in 
Midwestern states, and mainly in small-town and rural communities in Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, 
Missouri, Ohio, or Wisconsin, as well as in some parts of mountain states such as Nevada, Utah, 
or Wyoming (Figure 3). 
Figure 3. Income inequality across counties in the US (Gini coefficient, 2017). 
 
The third and final independent variable of interest is Economic and demographic decline. In 
the econometric analysis, we use four different proxies: three for economic change 
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(employment change, change in average earnings per job, and change in average wages and 
salary) and population change as a proxy for demographic change. The benchmark measure of 
change at the county level is employment change between 1980 and 2016. However, in 
successive parts of the analysis for all four economic and demographic change indicators are 
considered, covering, by decade, the period between 1970 and 2016. The data for 2016 is 
drawn from the 2013-17 5-year (ACS). For earlier years, we resort to Bureau of Economic 
Analysis data (2019). To ensure a normal distribution of residuals, all change variables are 
transformed logarithmically.  
Figure 4 provides an indication of economic change across counties in the US. It represents 
changes in employment between 1980 and 2016. As expected, the biggest growth in 
employment over that period of 36 years took place along the Pacific coast, in the north-east 
urban corridor, and in southern Florida. The lowest levels of employment growth occurred in 
the Great Plains states, along a strip running from East Texas in the South to North Dakota in 
the North (Figure 4). Many areas south of the Great Lakes and in the South have also performed 
relatively badly in employment terms. However, all is not gloom around the Great Lakes, as the 
area between Chicago and Milwaukee witnessed considerable growth in employment, as did 
most of the counties on the shores of Lake Erie. 
Figure 4. Employment change (1980-2016) across counties in the US. 
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Control Variables 
In addition, several control variables representative of factors that have been associated with 
the rise of populism in the US and elsewhere are included in the analysis. First, we consider 
income per capita in 2016, as variations in the territorial levels of wealth have been related to 
populist vote. Population density has been highlighted by certain authors (e.g. Rodden, 2019) as 
a driver of populism. Traditional parties – and mainly those of the left – are increasingly 
struggling in suburbs and rural areas of the US (Rodden, 2019). Population density at the county 
level is represented by its value in 2016. Unemployment is frequently regarded as another 
determinant linked to the rise of discontent and populism (Algan et al., 2017; Guriev, 2018). We 
control for the unemployment rate at the county level in 2016. Education is also a prominent 
factor behind the rise in anti-system voting. Low levels of education have, for many, been 
crucial for Brexit, the election of Donald Trump, and the rise of populist alternatives elsewhere 
(e.g. Goodwin and Heath, 2016; Sides et al., 2017; Essletzbichler et al., 2018). We, therefore, 
use an indicator of the percentage of adults with higher education in each county in 2016. 
Finally, the racial dimension has been recurrent in the analysis of the outcome of the 2016 US 
presidential elections, with some accounts highlighting that the role of race and racial attitudes 
may be more important than economic factors (e.g. Sides et al., 2017; Morgan and Lee, 2018; 
Reny et al., 2019). We control for the share of black population in 2016 in US counties and, in 
alternative specifications, for the share of whites in that year. 
A list of the variables in the analysis, together with their definitions and sources, is included in 
Table A1 in the Appendix. 
Descriptive analysis  
What is the connection between the dependent variable (the Trump margin) and the 
independent variables of interest? Plotting the correlation between the Trump margin in the 
2016 US presidential election and the three independent variables of interest reveals that the 
correlation between social capital, inequality, and employment change since 1980, on the one 
hand, and the Trump margin, on the other, is, at best, tenuous. The strongest correlation is 
between employment change and the swing in votes towards Donald Trump. Counties with a 
greater decline in employment over the period of analysis supported Donald Trump in far 
greater shares than they had Mitt Romney four years earlier. The link between interpersonal 
inequality and the increase in the Republican vote is inexistent, while places with a higher social 
capital 2014 showed marginally higher shifts in votes towards Donald Trump (Figure 5).  
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Figure 5. Scatterplots of the link between the dependent and the independent variables of 
interest. 
Note: the population of the county is represented by the size of the circle. 
The correlations among the independent variables of interest are similarly weak. There is no 
link between levels of inequality and changes in employment, while counties with higher levels 
of social capital have, on average, slightly lower interpersonal inequality and witness slightly 
lower employment growth since 1980 (Figure 6). The link between county size and any of the 
correlations is highly imperfect, although larger counties tend to be somewhat more unequal, 
have lower social capital, and experience, with notable exceptions, greater employment growth 
(Figure 6). 
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Figure 6. Scatterplots of the link among the independent variables of interest. 
 
Note: the population of the county is represented by the size of the circle. 
Econometric analysis 
Basic model 
The question is whether these relationships stand when all these factors are included together 
with additional controls in a regression analysis. The results of regressing model (1), using 
simple ordinary least squares (OLS) and including state fixed-effects, are presented in Table 1. 
They highlight that, once the income per capita of the different counties in the US and the 
conditions of their state are controlled for, interpersonal inequality, long-term employment 
change, and differences in social capital across US counties are connected to a swing towards 
Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election.  
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Table 1. Basic model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
      
Income per capita (2016) -0.110*** -0.085*** -0.118*** -0.087*** -0.026*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Inequality (Gini 2016) -0.125***   -0.196*** -0.007 
 (0.021)   (0.020) (0.019) 
Employment change (1980-2016)  -0.033***  -0.033*** -0.017*** 
  (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) 
Social Capital (2014)   0.007*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Density (2016)     -0.000*** 
     (0.000) 
Unemployment rate (2016)     -0.001 
     (0.000) 
Education (2016)     -0.003*** 
     (0.000) 
Share of black population (2016)      -0.001*** 
     (0.000) 
      
State FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 3,078 3,078 3,078 3,078 3,077 
R2 0.583 0.624 0.593 0.637 0.724 
Adjusted R2 0.576 0.617 0.586 0.631 0.718 
F test 83.10 98.30 86.51 100.1 138.7 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
However, this connection is not always in the direction expected by Robert Putnam (2000) in 
Bowling alone. The combination of social capital and lower inequality as a bulwark of American 
democracy is nowhere to be seen. While richer counties shifted towards Trump’s populist 
positions in lower numbers than poorer counties, more unequal areas of the country were less 
swayed by populism. By contrast, places with greater civic engagement and a stronger social 
capital opted in larger numbers for the more extreme option. Counties that have witnessed 
considerable destruction of employment since 1980 were also lured to a greater extent by 
Trump’s discourse than areas that experienced greater job generation (Table 1). These results 
are robust to including the three independent variables of interest together in the regression 
(Table 1, Regression 4) and additional controls expected, according to the literature, to affect 
populist vote (Table 1, Regression 5). The only exception is the coefficient for inequality, which 
becomes insignificant when all the controls regressed together (Regression 5). 
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The coefficients for the control variables are – except for unemployment rate – in line with 
expectations. More densely populated counties, counties with a lower presence of university 
graduates, and those with a smaller share of black population swung less to Trump in 2016. 
These results are robust to changing the share of black population in a county by that of whites 
(Table A2) – with counties with a greater share of white population generally swinging towards 
Donald Trump – and to changes in the measurement of inequality at the county level. Counties 
with a greater percentage of people in the top income quintile (Table A3) and those with a 
higher proportion of individuals in the top 5% of the income distribution (Table A4) had a lower 
Trump margin in the 2016 elections. As in Table 1, the coefficients for these inequality variables 
remain negative but become insignificant in certain regressions. 
The introduction of interactions between the independent variables of interest barely alters the 
results emanating from the basic model. Changes in employment since 1980 and all the control 
variables – including income per capita at the county level – yield the same sign in the 
coefficients and Virtually the same level of significance. Once again, counties that have seen a 
greater employment decline put more trust in Donald Trump than they did in Mitt Romney 
(Table 2). Social capital remains positive and significant, apart from Regression 2, where it 
becomes insignificant, while inequality displays a negative coefficient that is only significant 
when the interaction between employment change and inequality is considered (Table 2).  
The only significant interaction is that between employment change and interpersonal 
inequality (Table 2, Regression 1). The coefficient is positive and significant, meaning that the 
swing to Donald Trump was more pronounced not only in poorer counties, in those with lower 
inequalities and high social capital, and those that had suffered a long-term employment 
decline, but also in counties where high levels of employment growth were matched by a high 
degree of interpersonal inequality. 
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Table 2. Basic model with interactions 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS 
    
Income per capita (2016) -0.027*** -0.026*** -0.026*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Inequality (Gini 2016) -0.053** -0.008 -0.009 
 (0.023) (0.019) (0.019) 
Employment change (1980-2016) -0.075*** -0.017*** -0.016*** 
 (0.016) (0.002) (0.002) 
Social Capital (2014) 0.002*** -0.002 0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) 
Int. Inequality-Employment 0.134***   
 (0.037)   
Int. Inequality-Social capital  0.010  
  (0.013)  
Int. Employment-Social Capital   0.002 
   (0.001) 
    
Controls YES YES YES 
State FE YES YES YES 
Observations 3,077 3,077 3,077 
R2 0.725 0.724 0.724 
Adjusted R2 0.720 0.718 0.718 
F test 137.1 136.3 136.4 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Different types and time horizons of decline  
So far, we have concentrated just on one side of economic and demographic change: 
employment change since 1980. What happens if we consider different types of decline? In 
Table 3 we take into consideration not just employment change, but also population change 
(Regression 2), and change in average earnings per job and in average wages and salaries for 
the period between 1980 and 2016. 
The results indicate that long-term employment and population decline over a period of almost 
40 years has been strongly connected with a swing to Donald Trump at the ballot box in 
November 2016 (Table 3, Regressions 1 and 2). Declines in average earnings and in wages and 
salaries are, in contrast, disconnected from the Trump margin. These results chime well with 
the sprawling literature highlighting that the rise of populism in the US has more to do with 
racial issues than individual economic factors (Norris and Inglehart, 2019; Reny et al., 2019) and 
with a sense of alienation of the white working classes (Cramer, 2016; Walley, 2017; Morgan 
and Lee, 2018) – what Kimmel (2017) calls ‘angry white men.’ However, they also powerfully 
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relate to the literature that has focused on geographical dimensions and, in particular, with 
long-term economic decline, mostly in Europe (e.g. Rodríguez-Pose, 2018; Guilluy, 2019) but, 
increasingly, in the US (e.g. Wuthnow, 2019). However, in contrast to the findings for Europe, 
where the rise of anti-system voting at the ballot box has been linked to economic and 
industrial decline, but not to employment and demographic decay (Dijkstra et al., 2020), in the 
US it is the slow demise of still strong communities that have been losing employment and 
population for some time that triggers the reaction at the ballot box to a far greater extent than 
declines in earnings and salaries.  
 
Table 3. Different types of change (1980-2016): employment, population, earnings, wages 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS 
     
Income per capita (2016) -0.026*** -0.029*** -0.028*** -0.028*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Inequality (Gini 2016) -0.007 -0.024 0.029 0.028 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Social Capital (2014) 0.002*** 0.001** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Density (2016) -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Unemployment rate (2016) -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Education (2016) -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Share of black population (2016) -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Employment change 1980-2016 -0.017***    
 (0.002)    
Population change 1980-2016  -0.022***   
  (0.002)   
Average earnings per job change 1980-2016   -0.002  
   (0.002)  
Average wages and salaries change 1980-2016    -0.007 
    (0.004) 
     
State FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 3,077 3,077 3,076 3,077 
R2 0.724 0.725 0.716 0.716 
Adjusted R2 0.718 0.720 0.711 0.711 
F test   138.7 139.9 133.5 133.7 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Once we have established that long-term unemployment and demographic decline have a 
powerful connection to Trump’s vote margin in the 2016 presidential election, the question is 
whether this association waxes or wanes with time. Table 4 looks at the change in these 
relationships over time – including the link with changes in average earnings and wages and 
salaries – since 1970 and shortening the length of the period covered by ten years in every 
regression. This implies that the regressions are the same as in Table 3, only substituting the 
time covered in each of the economic and demographic decline variables. Only the coefficients 
for these variables are reported in Table 4, as there are no significant changes in the other 
coefficients.  
 
Table 4. The dimension of the connection over time 
 
  
Employment 
change 
Population 
change 
Change in 
average earnings 
per job 
Change in 
average wages 
and salary 
2010-2016 -0.042*** -0.151*** -0.003 0.011 
 (0.007) (0.014) (0.005) (0.010) 
2000-2016 -0.030*** -0.061*** -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) 
1990-2016 -0.019*** -0.030*** -0.001 0.005 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
1980-2016 -0.017*** -0.022*** -0.002 -0.007 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
1970-2016 -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.004 0.003 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The coefficients displayed in Table 4 prove that the link between employment and population 
decline at the county level and Trump’s vote margin is not a recent phenomenon. The 
coefficients for employment and population change are always negative and highly significant, 
regardless of the period considered. Counties that have been shedding employment and losing 
population since the 1970s were more inclined to support Donald Trump than Mitt Romney 
four years earlier. Having said that, the dimension of the negative coefficients is larger for the 
more recent periods than for longer time spans. The 2008 Great Recession has provided a 
greater springboard for the rise of populist discourse and a populist candidate, but the seed of 
discontent had been planted, as indicated by Cramer (2016), quite some time earlier. 
Table 4 once again points to the fact that this reaction at the ballot box is more about the long-
term decline of communities shedding jobs and people than about the loss of earnings, wages, 
and salaries. The coefficients for the latter are always insignificant. Hence, “it is not the very 
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poor that are threatening the political system but the large numbers of still relatively well-off 
people – often seen as the threatened middle classes – still living relatively comfortable lives 
but in declining places” (Rodríguez-Pose, 2020: 1-2). 
 
Conclusions 
Two decades ago, Robert Putnam (2000) warned that American democracy was at risk from the 
twin challenges of the decline in civic engagement and social capital, on the one hand, and the 
rise in interpersonal inequality, on the other. More Americans bowling alone and engaging to a 
far lesser extent than before in local communities and an increasingly divided society from an 
economic perspective represented a threat to the democratic institutions that had been built 
since independence. 
Sixteen years later his forecast materialised to a degree with the election of Donald Trump, an 
outsider and political novice with strong populist tendencies, who first stunned the Republican 
Party elite by securing its presidential nomination, and then went on to beat the Democratic 
party candidate, Hillary Clinton, in the November 2016 election. 
Yet, the election of a candidate that, by shaking the system, has stretched American democracy 
to the limit, may have had little to do with declining social capital and rising interpersonal 
inequality and much more with the long-term employment and population decline of many 
formerly prosperous American communities. These communities are precisely those where 
social capital – the very form of capital that, according to Putnam (2000), was supposed to 
provide the glue for America’s democratic institutions – has held stronger than elsewhere. 
This is what this paper has shown. By combining social capital with interpersonal inequality and 
long-term economic and demographic decline at county level in the US and linking it to the 
swing to Donald Trump at the ballot box in the 2016 presidential elections, it has revealed that 
the rise in discontent identified by some scholars (e.g. Cramer, 2016; Kimmel, 2017; Wuthnow, 
2019) is at the root of 2016’s electoral tsunami. However, and in contrast to previous research, 
the analysis has put in evidence the deep geographical roots of this phenomenon. It is not just 
simply the white working class that is rebelling against the system. There are plenty of white 
working-class voters on the West Coast, along the eastern megalopolis, or in American large 
cities, but also in medium-sized cities, towns, and rural areas that did not swing and/or did not 
vote for Donald Trump. It is middle- and working-class individuals, who live in communities that 
have seen better times and have for long experienced a slow, but relentless employment and 
population decline, and where social capital has remained relatively strong, that cast the 
decisive votes to put Donald Trump in office. Hence, social capital and local civic engagement 
may not have acted as the positive forces envisaged by Granovetter (1977) or Putnam (2000), 
but more in a negative way suggested by Satyanath et al. (2017), through mechanisms possibly 
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linked to local consciousness and identity (Cramer, 2016). 
The long-term economic and demographic decline of many tightly-knit American communities 
is driving the rise of populism. A decline that can be traced back to the second half of the 20th 
century and that has created a malaise that goes well beyond the crisis and that is increasingly 
manifesting itself at the ballot box. Declining, but still rather cohesive communities with strong 
social capital are the drivers of this process. In mostly small-town and rural areas of the US, the 
rise in the populist vote is a consequence of a reaction of strong communities in which 
individual losses are strongly identified with collective losses. And social capital may act as the 
transmission mechanism. Individuals living in these communities know that a loss for one is a 
loss for all. Therefore, the rise of populism in the US is fundamentally linked to the geography 
of decline; to places that, despite remaining relatively homogeneous in terms of interpersonal 
inequality, have witnessed considerable employment and demographic decay over the long 
term. The Great Recession of 2008 may have ignited the fuse that resulted in the election of 
Donald Trump as president, but the discontent has been running for long and runs far deeper.  
By contrast, the places with far higher interpersonal inequalities and weaker social capital – 
mainly the cities – may be reaching boiling point (as seen in the aftermath of the killing of 
George Floyd in May 2020), but are not so far those responsible for driving the rise of populism 
at the ballot box. 
There is greater need to know the exact mechanisms through which social capital may 
contribute to transforming long-term decline into populist votes; more need to analyse, using 
both in-depth qualitative and quantitative studies, why the long-time brewing geography of 
discontent in declining small-town and rural America has only come to fruition from a political 
perspective in recent years. But one thing seems to be increasingly clear. The declining 
American communities – that have seen better times, that have been dismissed as ‘rust belts’, 
‘red neck areas’, or ‘flyovers’ – are no longer bowling alone. They are now golfing with Trump, 
and they will, in all likelihood, continue to play ball with whoever pays attention to their plights 
and allows them to exact their revenge at the ballot box against what they consider an unfair 
and harmful system. 
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Appendix 
Table 1. Variable description and sources. 
 
VARIABLES   N Mean Med St.Dev Source 
Trump Margin 3078 0.04 0.04 0.06 MIT Election Data and Science Lab 
Social Capital (2014) 3078 -0.00 -0.22 1.25 Researchers at Penn State and 
Rupasingha's et al. (2006) 
Gini (2016) 3078 0.45 0.44 0.04 2013-17 5-year American 
Community Survey (ACS) 
Employment change (1980-
2016) (ln) 
3078 0.34 0.27 0.43 ACS 
Income share of the 5th 
quantile (2016) 
3072 48.22 47.94 3.15 ACS 
Income share of the top 5 
percent (2016) 
3072 20.41 20.09 2.98 ACS 
Income per capita (2016) 
(ln) 
3078 10.59 10.57 0.23 ACS 
Density (2016) 
 
3077 232.74 42.80 1673.16 ACS 
Unemployment rate (2016) 3078 3.58 3.50 1.52 ACS 
Education (2016) 
 
3078 20.90 18.90 9.22 ACS 
Share of black population 
(2016) 
3078 9.86 3.10 14.66 ACS 
Share of white population 
(2016) 
3078 85.73 92.40 16.08 ACS 
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Table A2. Basic model, substituting the share of black population a county in 2017 by that of 
whites.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS 
     
Income per capita (2016) -0.027*** -0.028*** -0.027*** -0.027*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Inequality (Gini 2016) 0.002 -0.048** 0.002 -0.000 
 (0.019) (0.023) (0.019) (0.019) 
Employment change (1980-2016) -0.016*** -0.080*** -0.016*** -0.015*** 
 (0.002) (0.016) (0.002) (0.002) 
Social Capital (2014) 0.001** 0.001** 0.001 0.001* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) 
Int. Inequality-Employment  0.147***   
  (0.036)   
Int. Inequality-Social capital   0.001  
   (0.013)  
Int. Employment-Social Capital    0.002 
    (0.001) 
Density (2016) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Unemployment rate (2016) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Education (2016) -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Share of white population (2016) 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
State FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 3,077 3,077 3,077 3,077 
R2 0.727 0.728 0.727 0.727 
Adjusted R2 0.722 0.723 0.722 0.722 
F test 141 139.5 138.5 138.6 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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